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This thesis examines post-conflict justice in Iraq following the U.S. invasion, 
specifically, the legitimacy of the Iraq High Criminal Court and its first deliberation, the 
Al-Dujail trial of Saddam Hussein.  It asks: How can the United States infuse transitional 
justice through Western forms of judicial procedures into the democratic transition of 
non-Western nations under U.S. military occupation? 
The analysis begins with International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as a model 
of transformative post-conflict justice.  Then it turns to the cloudier legacy of the Tokyo 
Trials, where the internal contradictions of this approach gathered force in the non-
Western context and laid bare the shortcomings of the Nuremberg model.  Finally, it 
examines the Iraqi tribunal, which demonstrated many of the shortcomings of earlier 
tribunals, to the detriment of the United States and the new Iraqi government. 
This thesis does not concern itself with the guilt or innocence of the former Iraqi 
dictator.  The purpose is to better understand how the Coalition Provisional Authority 
established legal jurisdiction and to review the issues surrounding Saddam’s trial.  
Finally, it suggests judicial processes that could be employed in non-Western cultures to 
support the transition from an insurgent post-conflict environment to peace. 
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 1 
I. POST-CONFLICT OCCUPATION AND TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 
On December 30, 2005, the world watched in anticipation as Saddam Hussein 
was put to death by the government of a free Iraq.  Within days, the video of Hussein’s 
death went viral on the Internet.  The pixelated video captures an unstable Hussein, 
escorted by three masked men; a noose is placed around his neck.  Guards and observers 
chant: “Go to hell,” and “You killed Iraq.”  As Saddam begins to pray, a quiet man pleads 
to the audience: “Please stop, this man is facing execution.” 
The chanting stops, but the testy exchange seems to please the deposed dictator.  
Saddam starts to recite the second verse of the Shahada, an Islamic prayer; the scaffold 
flooring is released, and he falls to his death.  The onlookers erupt in a Shia prayer, this 
time with no response in the Sunni version from Saddam. The tone of the video is clear: 
The legal execution of Saddam was conducted with anger, hatred, and sectarian 
vengeance.  The animosity of the witnesses, guards, and executioners leaves the viewer in 
doubt as to whether the execution was justice or murder.  The circumstances of the Al-
Dujail trial and legal execution of Saddam present fundamental questions of the ethics of 
post-conflict justice within the new Iraqi regime.1 
A. NUREMBERG TO IRAQ:  HIGH ROAD OR DUSTY TRAIL? 
The purpose of this thesis is to review post-conflict justice transformation within 
Iraq following the U.S. invasion, in particular, the legitimacy of the Iraqi High Criminal 
Court (IHCC) and its first deliberation, the Al-Dujail trial, in which Saddam was one of 
eight co-defendants.  Ultimately, this thesis questions how the United States can 
strategically infuse transitional justice through Western forms of judicial procedures into 
the democratic transition of non-Western nations under U.S. military occupation. 
This thesis examines the successes—and the simmering discontents—of 
Nuremberg as a model of transformative, post-conflict justice.  It also takes up the much 
                                                
1 Video of the Execution of Saddam Hussein with English subtitles, accessed May 5, 2012. 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=8979cac556. 
 2 
cloudier legacy of the Tokyo Trials, where the internal contradictions of this approach 
gathered force in the non-Western context and laid bare the shortcomings of the 
Nuremberg model and the stories that the West tells about it to this day.  This thesis 
reviews the historical context of judicial proceedings for nations under U.S. military 
occupation in order to evaluate whether justice can be transitional.  Furthermore, this 
thesis examines the historical use of Western procedural judicial proceedings in non-
Western substantive judicial societies. 
The analysis then turns to more contemporary cases, notably Iraq.  The United 
States continued to embrace (and espouse) the Nuremberg model as it marched into Iraq 
in the summer of 2003.  Something rather different came of the Iraqi tribunal, however.  
In all, the methods of transitional justice under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
and the subsequent Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) trial of Saddam Hussein demonstrated 
many of the infirmities that the earlier tribunals at least implied—with consternating 
consequences for both the United States and the new Iraqi government. 
B. CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 
Part of the difficulty with establishing any kind of universally recognized and 
accepted model of transformative justice are the issues of culture.  Within Western 
democratic nations, the fairness and perceived justice of the law hinges on the legal 
process rather than the outcome of a given case.  Under American occupation, the 
restoration of peace depends on this procedural nature of justice.2  However, the 
perception of justice in a non-Western culture is based primarily on outcome, that is, the 
nature of justice is substantive, and success is predicated on the results of judicial 
proceedings rather than the fairness of the process. These different perceptions are a part 
of cultural narratives that are as central to their respective societies as the collective 
identity or the ethical core. 
                                                
2 James E. Baker, In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).  See esp. chap. 1, “Introduction.” 
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Legal scholars note that Western legal procedure has “a poor sociological fit with 
the non-Western societies to which it is applied.”3  For example, the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg established the legal basis of superior or command 
responsibility, in which military and political leaders can be criminally responsible for 
the actions of subordinates, even if the leader is physically removed from the criminal 
conduct.  The responsibility of leadership for wartime actions has been rooted within 
international law since the Nuremberg trials. In contrast, similar precedent has not been 
followed in non-Western cultures.  Many societies have failed to link superior 
responsibility for criminal activity in such cases as spiritual leaders, charismatic 
authorities, or individuals believed to have mystical powers.  In such cases, many non-
Western cultures have preferred to punish the individual who committed a crime, in lieu 
of the supervisor who may have ordered the illegal activity.4 
This thesis does not concern itself with the guilt or innocence of the former Iraqi 
dictator in the Al-Dujail case or the justification for U.S. intervention.  The purpose is to 
document how the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established legal jurisdiction, 
and to review the issues surrounding the IHCC’s trial of Saddam Hussein.  Furthermore, 
this thesis suggests judicial processes that could be usefully employed within non-
Western cultures to support transition from an insurgent post-conflict environment to 
peace, stability, and justice for all. 
C. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
Since World War II, the U.S. experience with regimes that deliberately use 
prolonged violence and terror against their own citizens confirms that post-conflict 
justice is a necessary tool for democratization.  The U.S. prosecutors at Nuremberg 
sought to develop a manner of justice that would instill in defeated—but still Nazified—
Germany the concept of individual accountability, the basis of Western, democratic law 
                                                
3 Tim Kelsall, “International Criminal Justice in Non-Western Cultures,” Oxford Transitional Justice 
Research Working Paper Series, April 12, 2010, accessed August 28, 2012, 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Kelsall_InternationalCriminalJustice_Final.pdf. 
4 Geert-Jan A. Knoops, “The Transposition of Superior Responsibility onto Guerrilla Warfare Under 
the Laws of the International Criminal Tribunals,” International Criminal Law Review, vol. 7, no.2, April 
1, 2007, 505–529.  
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(and a sharp contrast to Nazi notions of collective guilt, racial “fate,” or categories of the 
population on whom the laws worked differently).  Western, democratic legal 
procedure—due process in its vernacular sense—centers on the individual as legal actor.  
Secretary of War Henry Stimson argued at the time that a just enforcement of the law 
requires that  “[the] defendant be charged with a punishable crime; that he have full 
opportunity for defense; and that he be judged fairly on the evidence by a proper judicial 
authority.  Should it fail to meet any one of these three requirements, a trial would not be 
justice.”5  And justice, as a transformative act by which to found the new, peaceful, 
postwar West Germany, was the aim and the end of the IMT. 
Since the trials of Nuremberg and Tokyo, the use of justice as a transition to 
democracy remained largely unused until the early 1990s, mainly due to the bipolar 
balance of power during the Cold War, where the enemy of my enemy counted as a 
friend, whatever his human-rights record might be, and regime change happened under 
specific circumstances.6  After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United Nations began to 
prosecute individuals through the process of an International Criminal Tribunal (ICT).   
Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.  
Furthermore, the United Nations provided oversight for specialized courts in Sierra 
Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia. 
Following the first Gulf War, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries 
called on the Arab League of Nations to prosecute war crimes that occurred during Iraq’s 
                                                
5 Henry L. Stimson, “The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law,” ed. Guenael Mettraux, Perspectives 
on the Nuremberg Trial. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 618. In Stimson’s capacity as 
Secretary of War, he was in control of the U.S. occupation zone in Germany.  Stimson led the opposition of 
the Morgenthau Plan, which would de-industrialize Germany and divide the country into small, dependent 
states that could be monitored and mentored as they carefully developed toward democratic modernity 
without any capacity to menace their neighbors or dominate Europe in any regard.  Fearing the devastating 
economic conditions of de-industrialization, Stimson supported the IMT as means to establish proper 
judicial proceedings for the prosecution of war criminals 
6 Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the 
Nuremberg Legacy (New York: Routledge, 2008), 38-41.  Scholars believe the bi-polar nature of the Cold 
War limited western intervention of non-democratic nations that were subject to the abuse of human rights.  
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the United Nations began to prosecute individuals through the 
process of an International Criminal Tribunal (ICT).   Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 
1994.  Furthermore, the United Nations provided oversight for specialized courts in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, 
East Timor, and Cambodia.   
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occupation of Kuwait.  The request to try the Ba’ath Regime for war crimes in 1991 was 
rejected by the United States, under the Clinton administration.  An informal commission 
was created to investigate possible war crimes of the Ba’ath Regime in Kuwait, but even 
this effort was abandoned in 1997 amid political pressures from the other permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council.7 
In 2002, the Department of State (DOS) established a working group to address 
post-conflict justice issues in Iraq in the aftermath of the second Gulf War, including the 
use of ad hoc tribunals.  The DOS working group was called the “Future of Iraq” Project, 
and its report, published in March 2003, provided the blueprint of transitional justice as it 
applies today.  The report’s section on “Transitional Justice in Post-Saddam Iraq” defines 
transitional justice as a plan “aimed at transforming an unstable and chaotic state, caused 
by a dictatorship with a legacy of gross human rights abuses, to a democratic pluralistic 
system which respects the rule of law.”8 The premise for the DOS document on 
transitional justice is to ensure that the rule of law applies to all persons within the state—
to include the head of state—and citizens within a post-conflict environment have a 
credible means to address grievances.  The purpose of the occupation force is to establish 
the means of justice resolution in order to avoid, “self-help justice characterized by acts 
of vengeance.”9  The DOS plan for transitional justice includes four distinct components 
necessary to achieve a successful transition to the democratic rule of law: 1) truth, 
accountability and reconciliation; 2) legal reform; 3) institutional reform; and 4) public 
education and awareness.  The cornerstone to the DOS plan is an open and fair trial for 
individuals suspected of committing crimes against humanity.10 
                                                
7 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal,” 
Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. NN, 112-113.  UN opposition to the investigation is believed to be 
a matter of economic interest for nations of the Security Council.  In particular, France, Russia, and the UK 
had significant ties to the Ba’ath regime in the mid 1990s, and China protested that such investigation 
would violate national sovereignty. 
8 U.S. Department of State, Transitional Justice in Post-Saddam Iraq: The Road to Re-establishing 
Rule of Law and Restoring Civil Society: The Future of Iraq Project, Working Group on Transitional 
Justice, (March 2003), 5.  
9 Ibid., 4. 
10 Ibid. 
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The tenets of the DOS plan, however, do not eventuate automatically.  Instead of 
a smooth transition to democracy, the beginning of the U.S. occupation was cluttered 
with disorder, looting, and a general lack of public security.  As it turned out, the IHCC’s 
one-dimensional approach to transitional justice—through the demonstrative trial of 
Saddam Hussein—further escalated sectarian separation and biases within Iraq, and most 
likely influenced the escalation of violence for more than five years following Saddam’s 
execution.  Ultimately, the tribunal failed to provide the basis of lasting legal reform, 
institutions for reconciliation of grievances, public awareness, and the documentation of 
truth through a validated and accurate historical record.  In contrast, properly imposed 
methods of transitional justice could have influence societal unity, healing for victims of 
the regime, and possibly reduced the ethnic tension and violence. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
As the United States advances its worldwide contingency mission against 
terrorism, it will remain under international scrutiny for methods and practices of judicial 
processes, particularly where it seeks to establish (and prosecute) individuals in order to 
establish a Western method of transformative justice.  Since Nuremberg, the use of 
military occupation for post-conflict reconstruction has been founded on the legacy 
model of military tribunals.  This thesis examines the use of military tribunals for 
transitional countries under U.S. occupation in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
procedural justice.  The thesis questions the legacy of the Nuremberg as a model, and the 
use of International Military Tribunals as a pragmatic tool for military counterinsurgency 
operations.  The misuse of judicial proceedings within an insurgent environment can be 
detrimental to the transformative process.  Furthermore, the post-occupied partner nation 
can be left with the sour taste of victors’ justice, which not only casts discredit on post-
conflict institutions of justice, but also strains relations with the occupying nation. 
The trial and punishment of the Nazi regime through an international process of 
the IMT established the foundation and jurisprudence of international tribunals, thus 
becoming the benchmark for modern transitional justice.  This present work reviews the 
strategic objectives of Nuremberg and principles of the tribunal that have significantly 
influenced the international legal environment.  Then the analysis turns to the criticism of 
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the IMT and the legacy of Nuremberg upon the judicial proceedings within non-western 
cultures under U.S. occupation and a re-examination of the Nuremberg process as it was 
replicated in Japan.  The historical case study of the Tokyo Trials emphasizes these 
points of disconnection, disaffection, and distortion of the trial and the outcome that the 
experience of Nuremberg only suggested.  In this context, the normative view of 
universal justice for war criminals, based on the fairness and politicization of the tribunal 
process, is of particular note. 
From Tokyo, this thesis proceeds to Iraq and the proceedings for the criminal 
charges against Saddam Hussein.  Although the trial of Al-Dujail was conducted under 
domestic jurisdiction of the IHCC, the process was deeply rooted in the elements of 
international law established at Nuremberg.  Furthermore, the 50-year separation of this 
case study from Nuremberg and Tokyo requires a more detailed review of the 
international legal norms, customary law, and treaty obligations established since the end 
of World War II.  The thesis reviews the limitations of U.S. occupation forces in Iraq, 
which were not present during the Allies occupation, and how such limitations affected 
the IST.11 
In conclusion, this thesis will review the United States’ use of democratic forms 
of justice and the lessons learned by international tribunals that attempt to enforce legal 
norms of justice for war criminals.  Then it recommends a method for a U.S. military 
occupation force to successfully transition non-western nations from “an unstable and 
chaotic state, caused by a dictatorship with a legacy of gross human rights abuses, to a 
democratic pluralistic system which respects the rule of law.”12 
For the purpose of this thesis, the evaluation of transitional justice will focus on 
the manner and methods by which the occupation authority prosecutes and tries the 
members of the prior regime for major crimes.  The ultimate determination of the 
                                                
11 There were four successful international tribunals before the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002.  Those include the IMT at Nuremberg, the IMT-FE, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, and Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.  Furthermore, 
the United Nations provided oversight for specialized courts in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and 
Cambodia.  This thesis may reference these tribunals, however, the case study selection excludes a detailed 
review of these cases due to the lack of involvement of U.S. forces as an occupational authority.   
12 U.S. Department of State, Transitional Justice in Post-Saddam Iraq, 5. 
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efficacy of transitional justice is the accountability for violators of international laws and 
norms.  While the ultimate goal is to establish the truth concerning such violations, the 
purpose of the tribunal process is to gather facts, determine accountability, and prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—a more circumspect mandate, perhaps, suffused in the 
procedure-is-justice view of the established western democracies. 
This disconnect between the political and societal ambitions for tribunals versus 
the actual potential (and limits) of the tribunal process sets the stage for the uneven 
results that tribunals have had in terms of both transition and justice.  As this thesis 
demonstrates, the problem is exacerbated by the conventions and assumptions of Western 
legal practice, especially when it is transplanted to a non-Western context.  Nuremberg 
may not be a vestige of a particular time and place, but the context does matter to the 
ultimate outcome of any transitional-justice project.  The pages that follow illuminate this 
context to bring into relief those policies and practices that may secure the blessings of 
the Nuremberg model for the United States and its partners alike, while resolving the 
tensions and conflicts that have beset the tribunal approach, especially in recent years. 
 9 
II. THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 
The legacy and the logic of Nuremberg was revitalized in the early 1990s, when 
the United Nations used ad hoc tribunals to enforce international customary law in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  Furthermore, the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court in 2002 demonstrates the significant contribution of the Nuremberg model toward 
establishing international accountability for individual criminal acts. But what was the 
IMT in its own time?  And how much of the model was realized in the original 
transitional tribunal? 
A. ESTABLISHING THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 
Even before the United States entered into World War II, the ideal of justice as a 
means to the resolve hostilities in Europe occupied U.S. leaders planning already for the 
post-war peace. As U.S. soldiers joined the fight against the Axis Powers in Europe and 
the Pacific, American judicial leaders worked to develop the legal methodology to 
engage the international community in order to establish an independent, impartial, and 
legitimate judicial process, specifically to try those who committed crimes during the 
war. 
National Socialist rhetoric and action became more extreme—and lawless—as the 
war went on, particularly when the momentum of victory started to shift against the 
Germans.  When in 1942 Operation Barbarossa failed to produce a Nazi triumph over the 
Soviet Union, the war in Europe became a war of annihilation between Hitler’s Third 
Reich and Stalin’s USSR, echoed in the Nazis’ launch of the most lethal stage of the 
Holocaust.  Meanwhile, by now, the Western allies recognized that the totalitarian 
ideologies of the Axis powers were mutually exclusive of democracy.  The scope and 
scale of the post-war project expanded, including the role of justice in the fundamental 
transformation of the aggressors and, in fact, the European order that, to some minds in 
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Washington, gave rise to such extremism and violence.  The new and peaceful Germany 
required a founding act of transformative justice.13 
Beginning in 1942, the leaders of the so-called Big Three (the United States, 
Britain, and the Soviet Union) as well as representatives of nations occupied by the Nazi 
regime gathered variously to discuss post-conflict resolution for the aggressive war 
waged by the Third Reich.  After three conferences, Tehran (1943), Yalta (1945), and 
Potsdam (1945), the Big Three agreed on a legal forum for punishment of the Nazi 
powers.  On August 8, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, the French 
Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed the London Agreement, 
establishing the International Military Tribunal trial and punishment of the Nazi war 
criminals.14 This IMT took up its work in the Palace of Justice in the northern Bavarian 
city of Nuremberg.  Known as the Nuremberg trials, the IMT prosecuted the most 
prominent members of the political, military, and economic leadership of the Nazi 
regime, with indictments against twenty-four individuals and seven organizations deemed 
to represent the very top echelons of the Nazi party and state.15 
Article Six of the Nuremberg Charter establishes the “triple strata” of serious 
crimes within international law: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.16  Proponents argue that Article Six transformed the future discourse of 
international law by establishing individual accountability for international crimes.17  
This article of the Charter dispenses with both collective guilt (which notion is at odds 
                                                
13 Henry L. Stimson, “Memorandum Opposing the Morgenthau Plan: 9 Sept. 1944,” in The Nurenberg 
War Crimes Trial 1956-1946: A Documentary of History, ed. Michael R. Marrus, (Boston and New York: 
Bedford/St. Martin's, 1997), 26–27. 
14 See the London Agreement of August 8th, 1945, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtchart.asp. 
15 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal–Annex to the Agreement for the 
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (“London Agreement”), 
August 8, 1945.  Referred to as: UN, Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See, for example, the remarks of Warren R. Austin, Chief Delegate of the United States, in his 
opening address to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1946:  “[The IMT] makes planning or 
waging a war of aggression a crime against humanity for which individuals as well as nations can be 
brought before the bar of international justice, tried, and punished.” Reported in Quincy Wright, “The Law 
of the Nuremberg Trial,” in The American Journal of International Law, vol. 41, no. 1 (January 1947), 38. 
(Citing a New York Times article as its source).  The author notes further that President Truman had made 
similar comments. 
 11 
with Western jurisprudence in the first place and which would have had the curious effect 
of lessening the culpability of any individual perpetrator because 70 million Germans, or 
perhaps 8.5 million Nazi party members, would share the guilt under such a scheme) and 
sovereign immunity (which protects statesmen from prosecution for legitimate and lawful 
official decisions made while in office).  Per Article Six, defendants at Nuremberg were 
officially and individually charged with punishable crimes.18 
Proponents of the tribunal insist that the fairness of the proceedings was 
unquestionable.  By the terms of the IMT Charter, defendants were allowed to cross-
examine witnesses, speak on their own behalf, and directly address the members of the 
tribunal.19  “In their insistence on fairness to the defendants, the charter and the tribunal 
leaned over backwards.”20  Section IV of the tribunal’s charter establishes the rights of 
the defendants.  Proponents of the legacy believe the fairness of the trial was guaranteed 
through proper counsel and defense.  Under the charter, those accused had the right to 
disclosure, provided proper counsel, and the ability to conduct his own defense of the 
evidence against him.  Stimson argued that under Section IV, “we gave the Nazis what 
they had denied their own opponents—the protection of the law.  The Nuremberg tribunal 
was thus in no sense an instrument of vengeance but the reverse.”21 
The first trial—the one most commonly considered the Nuremberg trial, though 
actually several took place in this venue—ran from November 20, 1945, until October 1, 
1946, and ended with convictions for 19 defendants (of the 22 originally named) and 
sentences ranging from 10-year prison terms (Admiral Karl Dönitz, the head of the 
German Navy who took over as German president following Hitler’s suicide) to life 
terms (Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy) to death by hanging for such Nazi luminaries as 
Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, ideologist Alfred Rosenberg, chief of the Wehrmacht 
                                                
18 In the event, the Nuremberg indictments contained four counts—the three named international 
crimes plus the common plan or conspiracy to commit them, which was Count 1.  The defendants were 
charged variously among the four counts, depending on their role in the Nazi state.  See Table 1 in this 
thesis, below. 
19 Cite to the charter here; see also, Wright, “The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,” 40. 
20 Stimson, “The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law,” 622. 
21 Stimson, “The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law,” 617.  The IMT tried 24 members of the Nazi 
regime; five were determined innocent or acquitted of charges, seven received jail sentences (three 
sentenced to life), and 12 were sentenced to death. 
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high command Wilhelm Keitel, and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.22  (The 
Soviet judge was on record at the time, griping that too few of the defendants were 
sentenced to death.23)  Tellingly, there were three acquittals (Hans Fritzche, an official of 
the Propaganda Ministry who was charged in place of Joseph Goebbels; the former 
chancellor Franz von Papen, who stayed on as Hitler’s vice-chancellor for the early years 
of the Third Reich; and Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht).24  These results 
demonstrate the punctilious adherence to the rules of procedure that characterize all 
western notions of a fair trial—and get to the heart of the trial as a “demonstration 
model” of the rule of law in action. 
The IMT went on to conduct 12 more trials of high-ranking German officials at 
Nuremberg. Each of the allied occupying powers also implemented war crimes 
proceedings, based on the precedent of Nuremberg.  “Between December 1946 and April 
1949, U.S. prosecutors tried 177 persons and won convictions of 97 defendants.”25  Once 
the occupation ended formally, the West German government continued to try individuals 
for crimes committed during the Third Reich.  In other words, the Nuremberg trials began 
a process in which the Germans, ultimately under their own power, began to come to 
terms with the Nazi past through judicial proceedings, thoroughly suffused in the rule of 
law. 
 
                                                
22 Henry L. Stimson, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., and Francis Biddle, “Memorandum for the President: 22 
Jan. 1945,” in The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, ed. Michael R. Marrus. (Boston and New York:  
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1997), 30-32. 
23 Wright, “The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,” 43 
24 Stimson, Stettinius, and Biddle, “Memorandum for the President:  22 Jan. 1945,” 57-780.  Two 
defendants did not stand trial at all.  Robert Ley, who headed the German Labor Front, committed suicide 
before proceedings could begin.  Industrialist Gustav Krupp, in his 80s, was declared medically unfit for 
trial.  
25 The U.S. Army had begun conducting its own war crimes proceedings as early as April 1945, 
though these early proceedings were “entirely within the traditional concept of war crimes as specific acts 
against the laws and usages of war committed by soldiers during hostilities.”  Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. 
Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1949, a volume in the Army Historical Series, edited by 
Maurice Matloff (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1975), p. 391.  Combined Chiefs of Staff 
decisions later in the year expanded the categories of crimes brought to trial to include “battlefield crimes, 
offenses against Americans no matter where they were committed, and crimes relating to concentration 
camps and similar institutions.”  Ibid, 392.  Eventually, under Control Council Law No. 10, the Army 
adopted the Nuremberg criteria and precedents in its war crimes proceedings, ultimately bringing charges 




Sentence Notes 1 2 3 4 
Bormann, Martin I - G G Death Nazi Party Secretary. Sentenced to 
death in absentia 
Donitz, Karl I G G - 10 Years Leader of the Kriegsmarine, 
initiated the U-boat campaign 
Frank, Hans I - G G Death Reich Law Leader 
Frick, Wilhelm I G G G Death Minister of the Interior, co-author 
of the Nuremberg race laws 
Fritzsche, Hans I - I I Acquitted Head of the news division of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry 
Funk, Walther I G G G Life in Prison Minister of Economics 
Goring, Hermann G G G G Death Commander of the Luftwaffe 
Hess, Rudolf G G I I Life in Prison Hitler’s Deputy Fuhrer 
Jodl, Alfred G G G G Death General of the Wehrmacht 
Katlenbrunner, 
Ernst I - G G Death Highest surviving leader of the SS 
Keitel, Wilhelm G G G G Death Head of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) 
Neurath, 
Constantin von G G G G 15 years Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Papen, Franz von I I - - Acquitted 
Chancellor of Germany 1932, 
Vice-Chancellor under Hilter 
1933-1934 
Raeder, Erich G G G - Life in Prison Commander In Chief of the Kriegsmarine 
Ribbentrop, 
Joachim G G G G Death 
Ambassador and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
Rosenberg, Alfred G G G G Death Leading Nazi theory ideologist 
Sauckel, Fritz I I G G Death Plenipotentiary general for slave labor 
Schacht, Hjalmar I I - - Acquitted Leading banker for the Reichsbank 
Schirach, Baldur 
von I - - G 20 Years 
Head of the Hitlerjugend, Reich 
youth leader 
Seyss-Inquart, 
Arthur I G G G Death 
Reich Commissioner of occupied 
Netherlands 
Speer, Albert I I G G 20 Years Minister for Armaments and War production 
Streicher, Julius I - - G Death Founder and editor of the anti-Semitic newspaper, Der Sturmer 
 
Table 1.   Nuremberg Defendants (After Marrus, 1997) 
LEGEND:  Charge:  1) Crimes against peace, 2) Waging wars of aggression, 3) War 
crimes, 4) Crimes against humanity.   With respect to their charge, defendants were 
either: indicted but acquitted (I), indicted and found guilty (G), or not charged (-).26 
                                                
26 Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial.  See esp. Appendix, “The Defendants and 
Their Fate.” 
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The trials at Nuremberg successfully transformed German society from the 
chaotic, repressive control of the Nazi regime, and established a democratic form of 
justice that upheld the rule of law. As historian Konrad Jarausch notes, “the Nuremberg 
trials were a necessary attempt to avenge by judicial means the ‘violation of the 
conventions of civilization’ wrought by the Nazis’ crimes.”27  The lessons of Nuremberg 
even echo in the Federal German constitution, with its prominent and explicit 
affirmations of the German commitment to law, democracy, and human rights.  Indeed, 
the preamble of the document begins by characterizing the German people as:  
“[c]onscious of their responsibility before God and man … .”28 To advocates of this 
approach to justice-as-transformation, the experience of Nuremberg proves that 
international prosecution is not only feasible, but also capable of achieving transitional 
justice and reconciliation for the victims of war crimes. 
Thus, the Nuremberg legacy was born.29  Robert Jackson, serving as the chief 
U.S. prosecutor at the IMT, recognized both the promise and the peril of Nuremberg as a 
precedent for the future.  During his opening statement to the tribunal, Jackson stated: 
“We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the 
record on which history will judge us tomorrow.”30  By most accounts, the past 65 years 
of transitional justice and its happily-ever-after-effects in Germany shows that 
Nuremberg should be viewed as “an episode that would leave an enduring judicial 
monument, to mark a giant step in the growth of international law.”31 It also became the 
universal model for transforming a war-torn society into a peaceful, democratic nation. 
                                                
27 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 7. 
28 See the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2010 version, available as a download 
from the federal parliament: http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/documents/legal/index.html . 
29 Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice.  See esp. chap. 1, “Introduction.” 
30 Robert H. Jackson, The Nurnberg Case: Together With Other Documents (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1947), 33-34.  See esp. chap. 3, “Opening Statement for the United States, November 21, 1945.” 
31 Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (New York: New York Times 
Books, 1970), 80. 
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B. VICTORS’ JUSTICE: THE LEADING CRITIQUE OF NUREMBERG 
There is something almost sacrilegious to the suggestion that the Nuremberg trials 
may have had more than a whiff of victors’ justice about them, but the allegation was at 
least whispered at the time and has persisted ever since—and not just in company that 
pines for its party badges and stiff-armed salutes.  As Jarausch notes, contemporary 
observers of the trial “had little difficulty casting it as ‘the justice of the victors’ because 
Soviet crimes, such as the mass shootings of Polish officers in 1940 in the Katyn Forest, 
were also attributed to the Nazis.”32   Jurist Georg Schwarzenberger, for example, has 
compared the tribunal to wars in which the losing nation is subject to criminal trial by the 
winning side, meaning post-war tribunals are merely a form of victors’ justice. (Hermann 
Goering, who represented himself before the IMT, also had argued the victors’ justice 
point,33 but Schwarzenberger, a German Jew who became an eminent legal scholar in 
Britain, can hardly be supposed to advance pro-Nazi apologia.) The first question that 
rises in this context is whether Nuremberg really was the transitional-justice event that it 
is conventionally held to be. 
For one thing, there is the matter of judicial procedure, which, upon closer 
inspection, seems to have been less consistently practiced or enforced than the IMT’s 
latter-day champions suggest.  The Charter of Nuremberg, and IMTs in general, are 
organized to expedite judicial proceedings rather than preserve procedural methods of 
equality before the law as known in other fora.  For example, Article 19 of the 
Nuremberg Charter states: “The tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of 
evidence.  It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-
technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative 
                                                
32 Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 8. 
33 Wright, “The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,” 45. 
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value.”34  This article, and the manner in which the Allies employed hearsay evidence 
with a low tolerance for technical procedures of Western justice have been highly 
criticized for a lack of justice for the defendants.35 
Nuremberg revisionists also point to the rather more modest and specific 
ambitions of the London Agreement at the time of its signing.  Legal philosopher Hans 
Kelsen, for example, claims that this legislative treaty was not a multinational effort to 
establish a precedent for the future of international law; rather, the tribunal’s charter was 
designed in a manner that an individual nation would have administered such a trial.36  In 
Kelsen’s view, the charter was not designed to modernize international cooperation or 
design an international court of justice: “[The] intent of the tribunal was to establish a 
joint military tribunal under municipal law rather than a truly international tribunal.”37 
Furthermore, the declaration of the London Agreement jumped to the conclusion 
that war is illegal, thus the very act of war constitutes a crime. For example, the 
Nuremberg trials overlooked the actions of a soldier under orders.  The IMT criminalized 
inhumane acts of warfare by soldiers in a form of ex-post facto legislation, in which 
members of the Nazi regime were tried for crimes they had unknowingly committed.  For 
example, before World War II the U.S. Department of War claimed the laws of warfare 
preserved the innocence for soldier’s actions while under orders of a superior.  War 
Department Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, dated October 1, 1940, stated: 
 
                                                
34 UN, Charter of the International Military Tribunal.  This arguably looser procedural standard came 
to apply to the courts of the U.S. military government in occupied Germany, as well.  Whereas military 
“commissions operated under the elaborate regulations for courts martial […, the] regulations for military 
government courts, on the other hand, specified: ‘… rules may be modified to the extent that certain steps 
in the trial may be omitted or abbreviated so long as no rights granted to the accused are disregarded.  […] 
No greater formality than is consistent with a complete and fair hearing is  desirable and the introduction of 
procedural formalities from the Manual of Courts Martial or from trial guides based thereon is discouraged 
except where specifically required by these rules.”  Ziemke, p. 393. 
35 Arthur L. Goodhart, “The Legality of the Nuremberg Trials,” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg 
Trial, ed. Guenael Mettraux, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 628. 
36 Hans Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International 
Law?” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guenael Mettraux, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 278. 
37 Schwarzenberger, “The Judgment of Nuremberg,” 168. 
 17 
Individuals of the armed forces will not be punished for these offences in 
case they are committed under the orders or sanctions of their government 
or commanders.  The commanders ordering the commission of such acts, 
or under whose authority they are committed by their troops, maybe 
punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall.38 
 This statement was removed from U.S. military field manuals following the 
Nuremberg tribunals.  Before the IMT, the individual action of a soldier in combat was 
protected domestically as a form of collective action and collective responsibility.  The 
London Agreement challenged this norm with its claim of the individual responsibility of 
the Nazi leaders, thus prompting the critique of the tribunal as victors’ justice through ex 
post facto legislation.  Kelsen argues that the exclusion of domestic accountability 
supports the notion that “nobody will be tried by a court of his own state for murder on 
the ground that he, as a soldier, has killed in warfare an enemy soldier, even if the war 
has been declared illegal by an international tribunal.”39  Kelsen argues, that the tribunal 
failed to indict and investigate members of the Allied powers in a manner that was 
strategically limited to safeguard the victors. 
University Professor Reinhard Merkel furthers Kelsen’s claims by providing 
specific examples within the tribunal in which members of the Nazi party attempted to 
vindicate themselves through the defense of tu quoque.40  Defendants argued that their 
actions were necessary and practical during warfare—and no different then the acts of the 
Allied forces.  For example, Admiral Donitz was accused of waging unrestricted 
submarine warfare by sinking merchant vessels in the Atlantic.  His defense provided a 
counter claim that Donitz actions were consistent with the tactics used by U.S. Navy 
Admiral Nimitz, who employed U.S. submarines against Japanese merchant ships in the 
Pacific.  Donitz’ defense was tu quoque, claiming that “the Allies had engaged in 
                                                
38 U.S. War Department, Field Manual 27-10: Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: USGPO, 1 
October 1940), 87.  See esp. Chap. 11, “Penalties for Violations of the Laws of War.” 
39 Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg,” 278. 
40 Defined by Merriam-Webster as: a retort charging an adversary with being or doing what he 
criticizes in others.  “Tu QuoQue”  is an appeal to hypocrisy, and attempt by the defense to discredit the 
charges on the premise that the opponent failed to act consistent with the position of the court. 
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identical practices with which Donitz was charged showed that the conventions of war 
had changed, and that now submarine warfare was legal.”41 
Rather than risk the criminalization of Nimitz for his tactics against the Japanese, 
the tribunal chose to acquit Donitz of all charges.  David Luban claims this example of 
selective justice demonstrates the problematic nature of victors’ justice:  “It legalizes any 
crime committed by the vanquished provided the victor committed it as well,” thus the, 
“standards of conduct are driven down to whatever level of brutality the victors are 
willing to tolerate in themselves.”42 The Donitz acquittal demonstrates the lack of 
procedural equality during the Nuremberg military tribunal.  If the Allies had charged and 
tried actions of their own for war crimes, the morality of the IMT would have been 
strengthened.  Instead, the tribunal chose to avoid the application of universal justice, 
prosecuting only the Axis powers following the war. 
The use of the IMT as a form of victors’ justice is demonstrated best by the words 
of Lord Justice Lawrence, when he interrupted a defendant, stating: “We are not sitting 
here in court to decide whether other powers have committed breaches of international 
law, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.  Here we are dealing with whether these 
accused have committed such atrocities.”43  In other words, sauce for the goose is only 
sauce for the gander when both birds are facing the soup pot. 
C. THE NEVER-ENDING TRANSITION? 
More broadly, there remains the question of the ultimate effect of the trials.  
Jarausch notes that “the horrific courtroom images of man individuals and organizations 
that were reported in newspapers, newsreels, and educational films [at the time] (“Death 
Mills”) did not fall entirely short of their intended effect.  As a result, U.S. surveys 
discovered that roughly half of the German population considered the punishment of the 
perpetrators to be just.”44  Where does that leave the other half? 
                                                
41 David Luban, “The Legacies of Nuremberg,” in Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, ed. Guenael 
Mettraux, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008),  660. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Merkel, “The Law of the Nuremberg Trial,” 571. 
44 Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 8. 
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Jarausch writes that “the imperative of unflinching confrontation with war and 
genocide, imposed from the outside, triggered a defensive reaction”45 among the 
Germans and thus limited the extent to which Germans in first two decades after the war, 
at least, came only “half-heartedly” to any kind of real reckoning about their share of 
Nazi culpability—which, arguably, forms the heart of any program of “never again.”46  
As Jarausch notes, the West Germans did not establish a central documentation office for 
prosecutions of National Socialist crimes until 1958—more than a decade after the first 
Nuremberg tribunal wrapped up its business.47  The delay does not bespeak an ardent 
embrace of the judicial method of de-Nazification.  It took another five years before this 
German authority convened a trial of several persons charged with crimes at the 
Auschwitz death camp complex. 
Today, despite the habitual sensitivities to the past among Germans, few 
observers seriously concern themselves with a Nazi resurgence in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, but this development may owe as much to the passage of time, prolonged 
exposure to western-style liberal-democracy, and the long post-war German prosperity as 
to the dubious effects of the IMT. 
                                                
45 Ibid., 270. 
46 The un-done aspect of the German sense of German history continues to come up in the public 
discourse, whether in the much-discussed “historians’ debate” of the 1980s—a reliable summary and even-
handed analysis in English appears in Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past:  History, Holocaust, and 
German National Identity (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1988)—to the more recent musings 
by prominent German politicians about the efficacy of “multiculturalism.”   
47 Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 270. 
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III. THE TOKYO TRIALS 
 The legacy of Nuremberg neither accounts for nor even really acknowledges the 
proceedings of Japanese war criminals at the International Military Tribunal of the Far 
East, even though both tribunals—and both societal transitions—occurred more or less at 
the same time.  The Nuremberg paradigm failed to translate completely even in 1946. As 
noted by scholar Guenael Mettraux: “The profoundly critical dissenting opinions of some 
of the judges in Tokyo and the overbearing nature of General MacArthur’s involvement 
in the proceedings have done much to weaken the fragile sense of judicial independence 
that had been safeguarded at Nuremberg.”48 
A. DEFEAT AND TRANSITION 
By surrendering to the Allies on September 2, 1945, the Japanese bound 
themselves by the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration.  Article 10 of the Declaration 
states that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have 
visited cruelties upon our prisoners.”49  U.S. occupation forces began arresting 
individuals suspected of war crimes as early as September 11, 1945.  General Tōjō 
Hideki, the Prime Minister during the attack on Pearl Harbor, was the first Japanese 
citizen arrested under the American occupation.  In all, more than 100 individuals were 
arrested between September and December 1945, suspected of major war crimes. 
The decision to initiate judicial proceedings for war criminals was approved in 
December 1945, in Moscow.  During the Moscow Conference, the Allied leaders 
designated General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) and granted him the authority to conduct a military tribunal in Japan.  The 
Charter for the IMT-FE was officially established by a special proclamation of General 
MacArthur on January 19, 1946. 
                                                
48 Mettraux, Prespectives on the Nuremberg Trial, xviii.  
49 Kobori Keiichiro, The Tokyo Trials: The Unheard Defense (Tokyo: Kodansha Ltd., 1995), 3.  The 
Potsdam Declaration was signed on July 26, 1945.  The purpose of the declaration was to address the war 
strategy and post-war policy for Japan.  The declaration was signed by President Truman, Prime Minister 
Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-shek (Republic of China). 
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MacArthur’s Tokyo Charter deviated little from the model used at Nuremberg.  
The charter established the jurisdiction of the tribunal, including the classification of 
defendants into three categories: Class A, Class B, and Class C.  Designation of Class A 
status was reserved for the highest political and military leadership within the Japanese 
empire and charged specific members of the government with crimes against peace and 
humanity.  The indictment process began in March 1946.  By April 29, 1946, some 28 
men had been charged with Class-A criminal activity—17 military officers, four prime 
ministers, and other political members of the Japanese war cabinet. 
The selection of defendants was a means of post-conflict reconstruction for the 
U.S. occupation of Japan.  The strategic purpose of the tribunal was to place the 
responsibility of the war squarely on those leaders who “deceived and misled the people 
of Japan into embarking on world conquest.”50  The list of defendants had one glaring 
mission: Based on the decision of MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito was not indicted. By 
maintaining the integrity of the Emperor, MacArthur and the prosecution team sought to 
create an emotional association among the citizenry that would “facilitate the strategic 
enterprise that was the Occupation.  In retrospect, this elaborate propaganda campaign 
was immensely successful.  The Japanese fell for it hook, line, and sinker.”51 The 
Americans preferred a pet emperor who could lead his people into a peaceable post-
conflict order. 
By extension, the tribunal process attempted to distinguish the everyday citizens 
of Japan from their political and military leaders with imperial aspirations.  During his 
opening statement to the tribunal, lead prosecutor Joseph Kennan stated: “We must reach 
the conclusion that the Japanese people themselves were utterly within the power and 
forces of these accused, and to such extent, were its victims.”52  Critics of the IMT-FE 
point first to the prosecutors’ aim to separate the citizens (along with their Tenno or 
“heavenly sovereign”) physically and emotionally from the autocracies committed by the 
wartime leadership.    Unlike the Germans, who internalized the ideal of individual 
                                                
50 Ibid., 9. Based upon the Potsdam Declaration, Article 6. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Joseph Kennan quoted in Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice, 57. 
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accountability to the extent that even today, military officers are schooled at length in the 
personal and institutional ethics of maintaining and serving German democracy, the 
Japanese people seem to take an arm’s-length view of Japan’s role in World War II—
even though such events as the brutal occupation and exploitation of China or the 
Philippines required the efforts of more than a handful of twisted men.  In all, western 
observers report, it seems as though the Japanese have developed a form of historical 
amnesia toward their past aggressions.53 
Either way, the Japanese people were not the only victims of Japanese 
imperialism in Asia.  The second major critique of the IMT-FE was the tribunal’s failure 
to address the grievances of other Asian nations that were subjugated to the Japanese 
colonial rule (for example: Korea, China, and New Guinea).  The historical record of the 
tribunal proceedings did not address war crimes against neighboring Asian nations and 
offered no reconciliation for the Japanese brutish use of force, demonstrating a lack of 
victim’s justice. 
The victors, on the other hand, seemed to critics to be front and center in the 
proceedings and the outcomes.  In the third place, indeed, the IMT-FE has been criticized 
as a form of an American political agenda to rationalize the Allied conduct of the 
justified war.  As written by B.V.A. Roling, the Dutch judge, the decision for the tribunal 
was “desired to show the American people and the world the criminal treachery of the 
attack on Hawaii.”54  This effort was clearly demonstrated by the prosecution’s selection 
of political and military officials directly linked with the decision to attack at Pearl 
Harbor. 
Essentially, the Tokyo trials have been criticized as a political means of 
transitional justice to ensure the dictation of the western view of the historical record.  
The established history was used later by the occupation force as a psychological 
campaign for democratization and demilitarization of Japanese culture.  The U.S. 
prosecution’s focus on the Allied war, coupled with neglect for the Asian victims of the 
savage Japanese imperialist military proves the occupation force had little concern for 
                                                
53 Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1995). See esp. Chapters “Hiroshima” 
and “Nanking.” 
54 Roling quoted in War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice, 59. 
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victim’s justice.  While the Tokyo Trials were created within the legacy of the 
Nuremberg model, the execution of the IMT-FE provided divergent results. The judicial 
precedence that was safeguarded in post-war Germany was clouded by the application of 
victors’ justice in the Pacific. 
B. THE TOKYO JUDGMENT  
The tribunal consisted of judges from 11 nations, nine of which were signing 
members of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender.55 The remaining two judges were 
representatives from India and the Philippines.  Thus, like the trials at Nuremberg, the 
judges of at Tokyo were all members of the victor nations.  Culturally, they were largely 
western, however, and this fact played out differently in the Japanese case than it did in 
Germany. An example was the “trial’s presence of major colonial powers in Asia—
including Britain, France, and the Netherlands—sitting judgment over Japan’s own 
colonial ambitions.”56  In the Tokyo trials, these leading western powers did not 
necessarily stand for democracy or progress; they represented a part of the problem that 
Japan’s leaders in the 1930s had tried, however ham-fistedly, to address. Even before the 
tribunal proceedings Justice Pal wrote:  “The apprehension is that the members of the 
tribunal being representatives of the nations which defeated Japan and which are accusers 
in this action, the accused cannot expect a fair and impartial trial at their hands and 
consequently the tribunal as constituted should not proceed with this trial.”57 
Moreover, some of the powers represented on the tribunal seemed to 
contemporary observers to pose undue threats to basic due process and, therefore, to a 
fair outcome.  Thus, defense attorneys argued against the selection of judges from three 
particular nations—Australia, Russia, and the Philippines. The Australian government 
had selected Sir Webb, who had served previously as an investigator and prosecutor of 
Japanese violations of the Hague Convention Law of War in New Guinea. The 
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defendants argued this was a clear conflict of interest, that Sir Webb investigative 
experience in New Guinea tainted his perceptions of the Japanese use of military force 
and he was predisposed with the determination that the defendants had committed war 
crimes.  Even more problematic to the defense’s case was Colonel Delfin Jaranilla of the 
Philippines, who was a former prisoner of the Japanese and a survivor of the Bataan 
death march—who might thus be presumed to be irretrievably hostile to all Japanese.  
Finally, the defense opposed the selection of Major General I.M. Zaryanov of Russia who 
was unable to speak Japanese or English, for criticism that he would create confusion and 
misunderstanding during the courtroom translation process. 
The trials proceeded as planned, despite these objections. The trials took place 
from May 3, 1946, until April 16, 1948.  The judgments of the tribunal took over seven 
months.  The verdict and sentencing began on November 4, 1948, in which all defendants 
were found guilty.58 Seven of the defendants were sentenced to death, including General 
Tōjō.  The remaining defendants received prison sentencing, all but two of which were 
sentenced to 20 years or more. 
To be sure, the judgment was not unanimous.  Only nine of the 11 judges 
supported the majority decision.  There were five separate opinions published by the 
judges; two of them were the dissenting opinions of Justice Henri Bernard (France) and 
Justice Radhabinod Pal (India).  Each of the written opinions provided objections to the 
sentencing of the defendants. The Philippine judge, Jaranilla, criticized the sentences for 
being too lax, claiming such light punishment failed to provide a deterrent effect for the 
future.  B.V.A. Roling, the justice from the Netherlands, opposed the death sentence for 
the only civilian of the tribunal, Prime Minister Hirota Kōki. The president of the 
tribunal, Judge William Webb from Australia, criticized the tribunal for failing to judge 
Emperor Hirohito. 
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Sentence Notes 1 2 3 4 
Araki Sadao G G I I Life in Prison Military General 
Doihara Kenji G G G I Death Military Commander/General 
Hashimoto Kingoro G G I I Life in Prision Military Colonel 
Hata Shunroku G G I G Life in Prison Military Field Marshall 
Hiranuma Kiichiro G G I I Life in Prison Prime Minister, Privy Council 
Hirota Koki G G I G Death Ambassador to USSR, Foreign Minister 
Hoshino Naoki G G I I Life in Prison Director of General Affairs 
Itagaki Seishiro G G G I Death Military General 
Kaya Okinori G G I I Life in Prision Minister of Finance 
Kido Koichi G G I I Life in Prison Minister of Education and Welfare 
Kimura Heitaro G G G G Death Military General 
Koiso Kuniaki G G I G Life in Prison Military General, Prime Minister 
Matsui Iwane I I I G Death Military General 
Matsuoka Yosuke     Died in Prison Foreign Minister, League of Nations 
Minami Jiro G G I I Life in Prison Military General 
Muto Akira G G G G Death Vice-Chief of Staff, Military Affairs 
Nagano Osami     Died in Prison Military Admiral 
Oka Takasumi G G I I Life in Prison Chief of Naval Affairs 
Okawa Shumei     Mentally Ill Intellectual, Japanese militarist 
Oshima Hiroshi G I I I Life in Prison Ambassador to Germany 
Sato Kenryo G G I I Life in Prison Chief of Military Affairs 
Shigemitsu 
Mamoru I G I G 7 Years 
Ambassador to China, Foreign 
Minister 
Shimada Shigetaro G G I I  Life in Prison Military Admiral 
Shiratori Toshio G I - - Life in Prison Ambassador to Italy 
Suzuki Teiichi G G I I Life in Prison President, Cabinet Planning Board 
Togo Shigenori G G I I 20 Years Foreign Minister, Germany/USSR 
Tojo Hideki G G G I Death Military General 
Umezu Yoshijiro G G I I Life in Prison Military General 
 
Table 2.   Tokyo Trial Defendants (After Futamura, 2008) 
LEGEND: Charge: 1) Overall conspiracy, 2) Waging wars of aggression (either China, 
U.S., U.K., Netherlands, France, U.S.S.R at Lake Khassan or Nomonhan), 3) ordering, 
authorizing or permitting atrocities, 4) violations of the Laws of War.  With respect to 
their charge, defendants were either: indicted but acquitted (I), indicted and found Guilty 
(G), or not charged (-).59 
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The most significant dissent came from Judge Pal, whose opinion drips with a 
skepticism of the great western powers that befits, perhaps, a leading figure from an India 
still under British rule. In his final opinion, Justice Pal protested the charges under the 
notion that war as a legitimate means of national security and was not unlawful prior to 
World War II.  He also lambasted the tribunal as an exercise in ex post facto law that was 
neither democratic nor particularly just. As such, Pal wrote, he would have acquitted all 
the defendants. Of note, Pal’s dissenting opinion was not read to the tribunal nor was it 
included in the historical record.60 
Following the tribunal, the Netherlands representative, Justice Roling challenged 
the appointment of judges, stating that, “neutrals and Japanese judges might have formed 
a counterpoint against the prevailing, and at the time almost undisputed, official attitudes 
of the victors.”61  Echoing these sentiments, Judge Pal wrote: 
A trial with law thus prescribed will only be a sham employment of legal 
process for the satisfaction of a thirst for revenge.  It does not correspond 
to any idea of justice.  Such a trial may justly create the feeling that the 
setting up of a tribunal like the present is much more a political than a 
legal affair, an essentially political objective having thus been cloaked by 
juridical appearance.  Formalized vengeance can bring only an ephemeral 
satisfaction, with every probability of ultimate regret.62 
Ultimately, the verdict of the tribunal was approved by MacArthur, and, following 
a failed appeal, the seven defendants sentenced to death were executed on December 23, 
1948.  During the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, the Japanese accepted the 
judgment of the IMT-FE, and the American occupation ended in 1952. 
C. CONTEMPORARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE TOKYO TRIALS 
The scholarly discourse and media coverage of the IMT-FE during the American 
occupation was highly censored.  Under the centralized authority of General Douglas 
MacArthur, the legal analysis and opinion of sympathetic supporters for the defendants 
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were suppressed.  MacArthur’s control of information and reluctance to tolerate criticism 
of the tribunal and its process marked a significant deviation of the Nuremberg legacy. 
Even MacArthur’s considerable will could not silence all the critical voices, 
however, and after the U.S. occupation, scholars “began to spread the view that the victor 
nations had wrongfully punished the Japanese leaders for crimes they had never 
committed.”63 Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion was published for the first time in Japan in 
1952—after the United States ended its occupation.64 Needless to say, his view that all 28 
of the defendants should be acquitted sparked significant public reaction in Japan. For 
more than a decade following the U.S. occupation, Justice Pal led a campaign to discredit 
the verdict of Tokyo trials in Asia.65  
In 1971, author and history professor Richard Minear published his book, Victors’ 
Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial.66 Translated into Japanese, the work expanded 
Justice Pal’s claims about the judicial precedent of war as a crime, claiming that 
aggressive war was not an international crime before, during, or even following World 
War II.  Therefore, Minear claims, the instigators of the IMTs at Nuremberg and the Far 
East could not claim “any legal foundations to carry out trials.”67 Rather, both tribunals 
were forms of victors’ justice.  While Western and Japanese scholars heavily criticized 
Minear’s arguments as legally inadequate and significantly under researched, his claims 
of victors’ justice resonated with in the United States—increasingly seized of the anti-war 
and “anti-imperialist” sentiments of the age—as well as Japan.  Whatever the 
shortcomings of Minear’s volume, it inspired further study into the tribunal’s 
proceedings. 
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Then in May 1983, a controversial documentary film, The Tokyo Trial, was 
shown in Japan.  The film was based on the U.S. record of the tribunal that was 
maintained by the Department of Defense.68  The documentary highlighted many 
contentious arguments of the defense council that were not included in the Japanese 
translation of the tribunal and were, thus, virtually unknown to the Japanese public.  For 
example, defense attorney Ben Bruce Blakeney—whose arguments on May 14, 1946, 
were completely omitted from the Japanese record—commented that the nation that 
dropped an atomic bomb was not qualified to judge war criminals in a court of law.69  
If killing of Admiral Kidd by the bombing of Pearl Harbor is murder, we 
know the name of the very man who [sic] hands loose the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima, we know the chief of staff who planned that attack, we know 
the chief of responsible state.  Is murder on their conscience?  We may 
well doubt it, and not because the event of armed conflict has declared 
their cause just and their enemies unjust, but because the act is not murder.  
Show us the charge, produce the proof of the killing contrary to the laws 
and customs of war, name the man whose hand dealt the blow, produce 
the responsible superior who planned, ordered, permitted or acquiesced in 
this act, and you have brought a criminal to the bar of justice.70 
 Suddenly, it became possible—and in some circles even necessary—to minimize 
the responsibility that Japan bore for any of World War II.  Instead, the prevailing 
discourse emphasized Japan's status as victim of great-power imperialism and the first 
casualty of the atomic age—the cautionary case that put the chill in the Cold War.  This 
view of a hapless Japan, minding its own business until two bolts from the blue in August 
1945 shattered the country but galvanized the nation, struck a chord with a population 
now two generations removed from the events at issue and keen to see a higher 
international profile for Japan..  To be sure, a dogged minority of scholars continued to 
keep Japan firmly on the hook of historical culpability, but the sentiments, particularly 
among the wider public, about the war and, thus, the tribunal embraced this revisionist 
view.  In this period, as a consequence, Japan staged more ostentatious commemorations 
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of its war dead and resolutely refused to acknowledge any complicity in, for example, the 
fate of the so-called "comfort women" of Korea, the atrocities visited on Nanjing, or the 
abuse of other Asian peoples in the name of advancing a ravening "co-prosperity sphere." 
That this unapologetic turn coincided with the apogee of the Japanese economy did 
nothing to assuage Japan's neighbors, who remembered the war very clearly and very 
differently. 71 
The 1990s drastically increased the criticism of the IMT-FE as a form of victors’ 
justice.  The end of the Cold War heralded the de-classification of Soviet documents that 
demonstrated the contentiousness of procedural and substantive decisions in the tribunal.  
Within the Soviet’s collection of the prosecution documents were a significant number of 
rejected requests of the defendants that were not included in the historical record of the 
trials. In 1995, Japanese Professor Kobori Keiichiro published his dissertation, “The 
Tokyo Trials: The Unheard Defense,” based on these documents.72  In this 282-page 
account, he outlines the defense’s evidence that was rejected by the IMT-FE and presents 
one of the more detailed—and scathing—critiques of the tribunal. 
More recently, the sixtieth anniversary of the IMT-FE inspired historians to 
review and rewrite the historical record of the Tokyo trials.  Most notable of these 
historical accounts are the works of Yuma Totani73 and Madoka Futamura,74 who have 
combined the published historical record of the tribunal with the cultural perspective of 
the Japanese population. Their research further develops the historical lessons of ill-
imposed methods of justice for societal transformation.  As noted by Futamura: 
The experience of the Tokyo Trial and post-war Japan…demonstrates that 
the impact and effect of international war crimes tribunals and their 
principle devices are not necessarily wholly positive, nor are they 
straightforward.  They may not only be complex, subtle, and multifaceted, 
but also counterproductive and harmful by distorting the perpetrator 
peoples sense of responsibility, guilt and historical perceptions.  Such an 
impact is not at all welcomed when the strategic purpose of an 
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international war crimes tribunal is to promote the healthy social 
transformation and true reconciliation, which are vital for the achievement 
of long-lasting peace in a post-conflict society.75 
 Western academics and legal scholars, as well, have viewed the historical context 
of the IMT-FE as an improper use of democratic principles within a non-western culture.  
M. Cherif Bassiouni views the Tokyo tribunal as a misapplication of the rule of law that 
was manipulated by realpolitik; claiming the pursuit of, “political settlements as having 
priority over justice.”76 Furthermore, the Tokyo Trials have received scrutiny from legal 
scholars as an inadequate application of legal precedent for modern forms of military 
tribunals. 
Less is written, even today, about the extent to which Japan successfully 
transformed its core social institutions in the wake of World War II.  In this regard, then, 
the common discourse has not advanced to anything like the degree to which the 
Germans continue to discuss their “inherited” burdens from the Third Reich.77  As 
problematic as the Tokyo tribunal was and is, the question for Japan may not ask when 
the transition will end but rather whether it has fully begun. 
D. LEGACY, LEGALITY, AND THE FUTURE 
The Tokyo experience provides a sobering counterpoint to the conventional 
“happy ending” of Nuremberg.  As Allison Danner best describes the jurisprudence of the 
IMT-FE: 
The legacy of the Tokyo tribunal demonstrates the risk of legal 
overreaching in a climate where the law itself plays an important strategic 
and political role.  If Nuremberg represents a qualified triumph of law’s 
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expressive power and moral force, Tokyo provides a reminder that legal 
strategies can also fall short of their intended mark.78 
The model of Nuremberg, as it was applied to the non-western Japanese culture, 
may need a significant re-evaluation.  If methods of procedural justice are to be used for 
strategic means of post-conflict resolution of grievances to promote stability, security, 
and societal transformation, then the standards and practices of judicial prudence must be 
realistic.  Effective transitional justice must take into account the manners in which non-
western substantive societies view just resolution.  Advocates of international or military 
tribunals must understand the strategic objectives of post-conflict transformation; they 
also must pay special consideration to the cultural differences in the perception of justice. 
The historical lesson of the post-war Japanese experience demonstrates that social 
grievances require a more strategic, long-term response. The occupational authority 
cannot merely separate the responsibility of war crimes, by placing blame upon a few, in 
an attempt to alleviate the future obligation to retribution and reconciliation.  The legacy 
of the Far East proves that true transitional justice requires a long-term perspective of 
institutional and judicial reform; the necessity to clearly document and articulate the 
depth and breadth of injustices; a means of reconciliation for the victims of criminal 
activity or misuse of force; awareness and education of the public for the purpose of 
social acceptance of a true and accurate historical record; and most importantly, transition 
requires a significant passage of time for cultural and individual healing. 
 If leaders of the United States would have analyzed and criticized the historical 
lessons of Nuremberg legacy, and its later application of transitional justice in the Far 
East, the strategic approach to the post-Saddam occupation of Iraq might have been 
drastically different. 
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IV. IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF THE AL-DUJAIL TRIAL 
The United States and Britain, doing business in Iraq as the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, stage-managed the trial of Saddam Hussein and other leading figures of 
Saddam’s regime with visions of Nuremberg—a founding act of justice on which to base 
the democratic transformation of the emerging Iraqi state—firmly in mind.  On the 
ground, especially outside of Baghdad’s Green Zone, it was beginning to look a lot like 
Tokyo, instead. 
To be sure, Saddam and his co-defendants were charged with crimes against Iraqi 
citizens throughout Saddam’s reign; the Al-Dujail incident itself dates to 1982 and 
retaliation following a failed assassination attempt.  The occupiers did not intrude into the 
trial with their own list of grievances, avoiding the Pearl Harbor fixation of the IMT-FE.  
Still, the Iraqi proceedings acquired more than a whiff of a “kangaroo court” under the 
watchful gaze of the CPA.  For one thing, Saddam argued in his defense that the violent 
response to the Al-Dujail incident was a necessary measure for the security of the nation 
that served the best interest of Iraqi society.  Both Radhabinod Pal and Georg 
Schwarzenberger had passed on long before 2006, but one of their chief contentions with 
the Tokyo tribunal—the necessity of national security—was alive and well in Baghdad 
this day. 
The cultural lens also obscured the meaning and the aim of the trial.  Before the 
U.S. intervention, many actors of the international community were aware of the 
regime’s crimes, “because Hussein and those in his regime who ordered and executed 
these crimes prided themselves in making them publicly known.  The publicizing of these 
atrocities terrorized Iraqi society, thus making it easier for the ruling regime to impose its 
will without opposition.”79  The liberation of Iraq was still fresh in 2006—so fresh that 
these habits of interpretation surely persisted.  As such, the publicity surrounding 
Saddam’s trial must of seemed like a similar exercise in propaganda.  Certainly Saddam 
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dismissed the proceedings as “theater.”80  Amid the growing insurgency, the show-trial 
angle resonated with the Iraqi population, especially the Sunnis, who proclaimed that 
court served only to humiliate the Sunni minority, of which Saddam had been the star 
player.81  Furthering the Sunni claim of sectarian vengeance was the conduct and timing 
of Saddam’s execution: 
The hasty and chaotic execution of Hussein on the first day of ‘Eid al-
Adha for Sunnis cemented the sectarian perceptions of the IHCC.  While 
opinions as to the legality of the timing of the execution have varied, on a 
political level, the decision must be seen as a serious mistake and reflects 
the politicized nature of the IHCC.82 
A. GENEVA, THE HAGUE, AND BAGHDAD 
On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat 
operations in Iraq.  Following this declaration, the United States and the United Kingdom 
petitioned the U.N. Security Council for the legal authority to establish their presence as 
an occupation force.  In response to this request, the Security Council formally 
acknowledged the Coalition Provisional Authority by passing Resolution 1483, which 
explicitly grants occupation authority for “the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration 
and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance.”83 
Resolution 1483 required the CPA to provide temporary governance of Iraq 
within the strictures of the UN Charter and international law.  In particular, the resolution 
required compliance with the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Convention. 
(The Hague Regulation of 1907 establishes the obligations and responsibilities of an 
occupation force.  In accordance with this customary law, an occupying force is required 
to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public 
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order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country.”)84 
Protocol I, Article 4 of the Geneva Convention refines the limitations on an 
occupation force established by the Hague Regulations. Under Protocol I, the occupying 
force cannot: 1) change the functioning of the governmental administration of the 
territory; 2) change the existing legal system; 3) issue penal provisions; 4) change the 
tribunal process; or 5) prosecute citizens for criminal activity committed prior to the 
occupation.85   The United States has not ratified Protocol I, claiming that the document 
“accords far too much protection and legitimacy to non-state groups, including terrorist 
organizations.”86   Nonetheless, the United States is legally bound to uphold the laws of 
occupation by Resolution 1483.  Therefore, the United States must adhere to applicable 
law that limits an occupier’s authority.  In the case of Saddam Hussein, the UN Security 
Council resolution restricted U.S. enforcement of criminal prosecution for war crimes 
committed against Iraqi civilians. 
The CPA was further restricted from prosecuting Saddam due to U.S. domestic 
law.  The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 precludes the United States 
from prosecuting individuals for war crimes, conceding the judicial proceedings to either 
the international community or the nation in which the crimes were committed.  The law 
states: “Persons charged with genocidal offenses should be tried by a competent tribunal 
of the state in which the crime was committed.”87 As such, the trial of Saddam Hussein 
and other leading lights in the “old” Iraq fell officially to the first provisional government 
of Iraq.  Nonetheless, the CPA maintained significant influence over the Iraqi judicial 
system, the tribunal process for the Al-Dujail trial, and the penal provisions of the IHCC. 
The customary interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention allows an 
occupying force to modify domestic law when the existing government of the territory 
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deprives civilians the rights and safeguards provided by the convention.  On the basis of 
this customary law, the CPA was obliged to defend their involvement in the 
administrative and judicial matters of Iraq.  Under Article 64 Geneva Convention, the 
CPA was obligated to protect civilians, maintain an orderly government, and defend the 
security of the occupying power.88   Immediately, the U.S. occupation force published 
CPA Order Number 1, The De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society. Similar to the “de-
nazification” of Germany following World War II, the CPA provision removed the top 
three layers of the Iraqi government and excluded for life all members of the Ba’ath Party 
(Saddam’s regime) from public office.89 
The unintended effect of this order was to redefine the scope and obligations of 
the CPA.  By administratively removing the highest civil servants within the government, 
the CPA crippled the regime’s ability to govern itself.  Thus, the CPA was forced to 
assume a role as a governing body, as well as, an occupation force.  Therefore, under the 
authority of the UN Security Resolution 1483, the CPA appointed itself, “with all 
executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives.”90   
Essentially, the CPA, under control of the U.S. military command, was simultaneously 
conducting counterinsurgency, nation-building, and establishing administrative 
governmental operations for the entire country of Iraq. 
This expansive mandate forced the CPA to establish rapidly a functioning interim 
regime with minimal capability of governance and no capability of security. Within two 
months, the CPA issued Order Number 6, formally recognizing the Iraqi Governing 
Council as the interim government.  The UN Security Council acknowledged the interim 
government by passing Resolution 1500 in July 2003. 
The Security Council, however, quickly undermined the Governing Council in 
October 2003.  In response to the increase in violence and the success of insurgent 
operations, the UN passed Resolution 1511. The provisions of Resolution 1511 limited 
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the powers of the Iraqi Governing Council and re-affirmed the United States as the 
occupying authority.  Resolution 1511 was diplomatically motivated in order to 
accelerate peace within Iraq by rapidly transferring governing authority to Iraqi officials.  
Resolution 1511 states: “The sovereignty of Iraqi resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming 
the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their 
own natural resources, reiterating its resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves 
must come quickly… taking forward this process expeditiously.”91 
The unintended consequence of this resolution was diplomatic pressure on U.S. 
forces to establish all aspects of a democratic regime in Iraq, despite the ability of the 
Iraqi government to provide security for itself.  The pressure placed on the CPA by the 
UN Security Council encouraged the coalition leadership to hasten nation-building by 
constructing institutions haphazardly.  Therefore, the CPA focused on establishing 
democratic institutions prior to securing public order, the result was a judicial system that 
was politically motivated and subject to extensive western influence. 
B. ESTABLISHING THE IRAQI JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
On December 9, 2003, four days before the capture of Saddam Hussein, 
Administrator Paul Bremer signed CPA Order Number 48, which outlined the judicial 
process of the interim Iraqi regime.  Deviating from the norms of international customary 
law and The Hague Regulations of 1907, the United States chose to transfer judicial 
authority to Iraq.   Unlike Nuremberg, where the Allied Control Authority identified the 
potential for chaos and maintained a military government and tribunal process run by the 
Allied powers, the CPA pushed the onus of the rapid transition of justice to the newly 
established Iraqi regime. 
The foundation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal was modeled after judicial systems 
of a democratic nation, in particular, the U.S. legal system.  This drastic shift of 
bureaucratic structure directly challenged the laws governing an occupation authority and 
the normative procedures for post-conflict justice. Furthermore, the CPA’s delegation of 
authority to the Iraqi Special Tribunal claimed to promote, “the rule of law in accordance 
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with applicable international law.”92   This claim, however, was shadowed with political 
influence and filled with controversy from within Iraq and the international community.93  
For example, the foundational elements of the tribunal process were modeled after the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; however, its procedures expanded the 
judicial authority of the new Iraqi government’s use of domestic procedural law in two 
ways. 
First, the Iraqi judicial system expanded the crimes punishable within domestic 
courts.  In particular, the Iraqi judicial model enabled judges to interpret international 
procedural law when evaluating crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or violations of applicable Iraqi laws.  The jurisdiction of the tribunal courts to 
try such cases was limited to crimes committed between July 17, 1968, and the UN 
recognition of the CPA.94   Essentially, the special tribunal was given the authority 
equivalent to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the purpose of conviction and 
punishment of the Ba’ath regime.  The second order effects of this jurisdiction enabled 
the Iraqi Special Tribunal to serve as an official court for domestic grievance and 
vengeance against the Ba’ath regime, as demonstrated in the Al-Dujail trial against 
Hussein. 
Second, the provision and jurisdiction of the Iraqi tribunal modified the 
foundation of the ICC and the United Nations opposition to the death penalty.  In 
accordance with CPA Order 48, the established judicial system recognized “the general 
concerns of the Iraqi people,” and the “desire… to try members of the Ba’athist regime 
accused of atrocities and war crimes.”95   While the order claims “to prevent any threat to 
public order by revenge actions and vigilantism,”96 the political nature of the tribunal 
process, coupled with the expansion of jurisdiction despite the normative procedures 
established by the ICC, demonstrates the contrary. 
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For example, the decision to accept the capital punishment for the genocidal 
crimes of the Ba’ath Regime violated the international legal norm of the Lex Mitior 
Principle, which grants a defendant convicted of a crime the benefit of a lighter 
punishment when there has been a change in the law.97  While the Ba’ath Regime 
adopted the death penalty as the maximum form of criminal punishment in the Iraqi Penal 
Code of 1969,98 the CPA formally suspended its use in June 2003—six months before 
Hussein’s capture.  Under the authority of the administrator of the occupation 
government, L. Paul Bremmer, CPA Order 7, Section 3 acknowledged the Iraqi Penal 
Code—with some notable exceptions.  In regard to the use of the death penalty, the order 
states: “Capital punishment is suspended. In each case where the death penalty is the only 
available penalty prescribed for an offense, the court may substitute the lesser penalty of 
life imprisonment, or such other lesser penalty as provided for in the Penal Code.”99  The 
law of the IHCC adopted the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, however, failed to acknowledge 
the CPAs suspension of capital punishment.  While Saddam’s defense did not challenge 
the use of the death penalty, this selective use of judicial powers further degrades the 
legitimacy of the tribunal and creditability of the IHCC. 
C. THE AL-DUJAIL TRIAL: SADDAM’S DEFENSE 
 Ultimately, the decision to have a domestic court adjudicate criminal activity of 
an international level has been criticized and viewed as a political means to seek 
vengeance against the former dictator.  Furthermore, the manners and decisions of the 
trial proceedings, to say nothing of Saddam’s execution, increased sectarian separation in 
the Iraqi post-conflict environment, most likely fanned the flames of the insurgency, and 
diminished the perceived creditability, legality, and fairness of the IHCC.  The capture of 
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Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003, was a historical event and necessary victory for 
Iraqi society.  The subsequent trial of Saddam and other senior Ba’ath leaders was a 
symbolic event that cannot be underestimated.  The establishment of the Iraqi Special 
Tribunal and its process developed for its first trial was a significant achievement.  
However, the hasty push to establish legitimacy coupled with the deviations of 
international norms will forever burden the legacy of the Al-Dujail trial, a legacy that has 
been criticized as victors’ justice. 
Before the official arraignment of Saddam, the Iraqi Special Tribunal was plagued 
by the “popular misconception that the trial was a form of American power.”100   This 
perception began in January 2004, when CPA Administrator Bremer pledged $75 million 
to establish the necessary institutions for the tribunal process.  Furthermore, during the 
spring of 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice sent prosecutors, lawyers, and 
investigators to Baghdad to aid the investigative process.  Judges were also provided 
training, by advisors of the CPA under a special task force designed to prepare the Iraqi 
judicial structure for trial No. 2, Al-Dujail.101 
Western influence extended beyond training the prosecutors and judges of the 
trial.  The CPA created the Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO) in May 2004.  The 
purpose of the RCLO was to select and vet judges and prosecutors.  The legitimacy of the 
process was intensely scrutinized for selecting neo-conservatives that aligned with the 
political opinion of the Bush administration.  Even before the arraignment of Saddam, the 
trial was perceived as a form of victors’ justice and an, “illegitimate process tailored by 
the Americans to seek revenge upon Ba’athist and bolster support for the war effort 
following the unsuccessful search for weapons of mass destruction.”102 
In July 2004, the Iraqi Special Tribunal arraigned Saddam and seven members of 
the Ba’ath party.  In the U.S. judicial system, the purpose of an arraignment hearing is for 
the court to establish the charges against the accused and to accept the defense’s plea.  
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This arraignment demonstrated the western influence within the trial process in two 
ways.  First, the procedures adopted by the IHCC did not require an arraignment process.  
This fact created the perception that the arraignment was convened based on American 
political influence.  Second, during the arraignment the sitting judge failed to announce 
the charges against Saddam and also failed to receive his plea, further demonstrating that 
the process was merely a show trial, and Saddam presumed guilty.   
During the trial, Hussein directly challenged the legitimacy of the tribunal, posing 
the question: “How can you charge me with anything without protecting my rights under 
the constitution?”103   The defense’s case was centered on the illegitimacy of any 
judgment against Saddam in light of his position as an elected official, and head of the 
state.  While “there is some dictum in U.S. courts in support of the proposition that head-
of-state immunity for acts committed during a leader’s tenure disappears when he or she 
steps down,”104 historically the courts have left such decisions to the digression of the 
executive branch.  Furthermore, the defense lawyers continuously challenged the order of 
the court, claiming that, “the tribunal could not lawfully impose any punishment because 
it lacked legitimacy or lawful creation.”105   This claim directly challenged the role of the 
United States as an occupation force and its significant involvement with the trial 
process. 
To Western legal observers, the diversity of verdicts and sentences demonstrates 
the happy prevalence of due process and, hence, justice.  To Iraqis, particularly those who 
felt disadvantaged or even persecuted by the new regime, the Al-Dujail trial was more 
cause for bad feelings—and malevolent acts. During the trial, insurgent operations and 
terrorist activity greatly increased.  Eight individuals associated with the trial of Saddam 
were murdered, and the original Presiding Judge, Rizgar Amin, resigned his position 
amid political and media pressure.  Notwithstanding Saddam’s guilt, the influence of the 
insurgency and inadequacy of the trial process instilled doubt about the impartiality and 
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fairness of the proceedings.  In the end, Saddam was duly executed, but little catharsis—
or transition—followed. 
 
Name Charge Sentence Notes 
Abdullah Kadhem Roweed Al-
Musheikhi G 15 years Ba’ath Party Official, Al-Dujail 
Ali Daeem Ali G 15 years Ba’ath Party Official, Al-Dujail 
Awad Hamed al-Bandar G Death Chief Judge, Al-Sa’dun 
Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti G Death Chief of Intelligence, Saddam’s half brother 
Mizher Abdullah Roweed Al-
Musheikhi G 15 years Ba’ath Party Official, Al-Dujail 
Mohammed Azawi Ali I Acquitted Ba’ath Party Official, Al-Dujail 
Saddam Hussein G Death President of Iraq 
Taha Yassin Ramadan G Life in Prison Vice President of Iraq.   Sentence was later changed to Death in 2007. 
 
Table 3.   Al-Dujail Defendants  
LEGEND: Charge: All defendants were charged with the murder of 148 Shiites from 
Dujail, in retaliation for a failed assassination attempt of Saddam Hussein on 8 July 1982. 
With respect to their charge, defendants were either: indicted but acquitted (I), or indicted 
and found Guilty (G). 
 
D. THE LEGACY OF AL-DUJAIL? 
The Al-Dujail trial will continue to mark a black eye for methods of post-conflict 
justice in the modern operational environment. The methods of transitional justice 
imposed by the CPA were carefully orchestrated within the context of the law, however, 
right or wrong, they have forever changed customary norms of international law 
established at Nuremberg. 
As one scholar has noted: “Within the highly politicized context of Iraq, those 
U.S. and Iraqi officials who participated in the establishment of the IHCC lost sight of the 
deeper and far-reaching significance and implications of these proceedings for the future 
of the rule of law in Iraq and in the Arab world.”106  While the decisions and actions of 
these individuals were in good faith, their actions leave question within the historical 
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record as to whether they were subject to external political factors seeking victors’ justice 
against the former Iraqi dictator. 
Using a judicial process against Saddam was seen by external political leaders as 
a broad method to achieve post-conflict justice in Iraq.  In the event, however, the lack of 
legal clarity, the visible role of western influence, and the lack of commitment to the 
achievement of meaningful justice have created perceptions that “the IHCC is a political 
body that is bent on exercising victors’ justice.”107  In retrospect, the Al-Dujail trial 
merely demonstrated that the judicial process could prove the well-known guilt of a 
tyrannical regime and punish that regime for its crimes. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE TRANSITIONS 
Following the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Ba’ath Regime, the CPA 
instituted policies that failed to promote an effective form of transitional justice.  As 
Fukuyama noted: “There was a tendency among promoters of the [2003–2011 Iraq] war 
to believe that democracy was a default condition to which societies would revert once 
liberated from dictators.”108  Iraq’s transition has proved rather more complicated, 
however. 
The demise of Saddam’s regime and beginning of the U.S. occupation was 
cluttered with disorder, looting, and a general lack of public security.  The deficiencies in 
U.S. post-war planning and inability of the CPA to restore a peaceful routine to daily life 
resonated doubts of the U.S. just war cause, and the Iraqi populace developed a, “mistrust 
of a U.S.-dominated trial process for the former regime figures.”109  Perhaps the 
establishment of the IST was supposed to kick-start the democratization process, but 
instead, more than a half-century of assumptions toppled over into a mess of clashing 
realities on the ground in Baghdad. 
 The first question is why the trial of Saddam failed to pay the full Nuremberg 
dividend of due process and democracy ever after.  The more basic and urgent question, 
though, is whether it ever could have lived up to the expectations attached to the 
Nuremberg legacy.  It is unfortunate, that despite the fairness of the trial or the 
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establishment of an independent judiciary, “the image of Saddam Hussein being taunted 
at his final moments is likely to stay in people’s minds as the legacy of the tribunal.”110 
A. THE LEGACY OF A LEGACY—AND ITS HISTORY 
Nuremberg was not without its detractors at the time or since, though the 
consensus that it did, in fact, represent a genuine moment of transitional justice is borne 
out by Germany’s continued acceptance of due process, human rights, civil liberties, and 
democracy.  In this regard, the IMT does prove the model for methods of transitional 
justice that began following World War II, at least in the European theater.  In its broad 
strokes, then, the architects of the Global War on Terror had every reason to prefer the 
Nuremberg model because they very much wanted the Nuremberg outcome. 
Two complicating factors make this goal much harder to realize after 1946 
Germany, however.  First, even after more than a decade of state-sponsored lawlessness 
under the Nazis, Germans had plenty of experience with a legal system, and a view of the 
role of law and legality in society that had its key elements in common with the process 
and precepts that the IMT brought to Nuremberg.  In a way, the Nuremberg trials restored 
justice to Germany, rather than introducing a fundamentally alien system in the name of 
transforming the state.  The IMT’s rules made sense, so the IMT’s outcome made 
sense—intellectually and culturally.  It was a relatively easy matter after that to build on 
this basis of western justice. 
The second flaw in the Nuremberg model comes with the nature of “transition.”  
At what point can we say that the German transition is complete?  Within the same week 
of January, several German cities marked Holocaust Remembrance Day (January 27, the 
day on which Auschwitz was liberated) only to witness Neo-Nazi demonstrations during 
the yearly ritual.  According to news reports: “Marking the 27th of January as a day of 
remembrance has turned it into a national event where everyone can express his opinion, 
however miserable.”111  Despite the emotional disagreements, a robust and fair justice 
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system exists to deal with any transgressions against German law, so in this connection, 
Germany’s transition seems quite thorough, but there remains a qualitative difference in 
effect and implication when the Germans talk about Nazism. The Germans and their 
allies still feel this difference, suggesting that, even with four decades of exertions by the 
‘68er generation and its children, some transitional business remains unfinished in 
Germany today. 
The societal transition in Japan has been even less forthcoming.  In contrast to 
Germany’s acceptance of the past autocracies, the Japanese culture has maintained a form 
of historical amnesia toward its past aggressions.  As Ian Buruma notes, Japanese cultural 
acceptance of the past shifts drastically from their perception of the atomic bomb at 
Hiroshima, in comparison to their view of the brutality of Nanking, and the war crimes 
perpetrated by the Imperial Army.112  In this respect, the Tokyo trials may well mark the 
starting point for the Japanese myopic view of their own history, and suggest that their 
perception of their history has been eroded by politics of post-conflict restoration, rather 
than a result of cultural differences. 
B. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
The trials at Nuremberg were an international effort to achieve justice for 
injustices of the Nazi regime; the transition of judicial institutions, however, were created 
and established by Germans.  Societal reconciliation and unity in postwar Germany was 
fueled by the Federal German national identity, rooted in resistance, broadly define, to 
the Nazi regime.  The Japanese model for reconciliation was much different; it was 
controlled and censored by the policy objectives of the American occupation. The lesson 
here is that the application of transitional justice is “affected by cultural and historical 
circumstances, but they are never determined by them.  If one injects politics into the 
enchanted Disney world of post-war Japan, things come into sharper focus.”113  The 
political decision of the American reconstruction, to alleviate societal responsibility for 
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Japanese imperialism from the citizenry, encouraged a view of victimization for the 
populace. 
Following conflict, the transformation of justice is predicated on the need for an 
accurate and truthfully documentation of the historical record.  A misuse of the tribunal 
process, based on the occupational decision to limit the Japanese guilt of war to the 
imperial aspirations of a few—with exception to the emperor, of course—has clouded the 
memories of the past and challenged the legitimacy of the tribunal. 
In comparison to the success of transitional justice in Germany, the Tokyo model 
might suggest that the cultural misunderstandings and differences undermine the use of 
judicial proceedings as a means to effectively transform to a non-western society to 
democracy.  However, in retrospect, the lessons of Nuremberg come clearer in 
comparison to their application in the Far East.  The experience of the Tokyo trials 
clearly shows that transitional justice requires more than the punishment of the guilty, or 
those perceived to be guilty for that matter.  The tribunal process, while necessary for 
victim healing and international accountability, is not the completion of the process. 
C. SHOW TRIAL VERSUS CRIMINAL COURT 
Al-Dujail, and the punishment of Saddam, in this case maintained the same 
political objective as the Tokyo trials. As in the case of Tokyo, the tribunal was 
motivated by political reasons other than the transition to a fair and equitable judicial 
system.  Essentially, Al-Dujail and Tokyo marked significant deviations from the 
Nuremberg legacy, even as they claimed to perfect the model.  In the event, they were 
show trials that attempted at social reconstruction without the formulation of truth or 
resolution for grievances.  For this reason, among others, the United States needs to 
examine the historical lessons from both Tokyo and Iraq as it formulates new approaches 
for applying transitional justice within the future national security environment. 
The prosecution of Saddam and other perpetrators was necessary and vital for 
both the procedural and substantive forms of justice. However, the decision to try 
Saddam within the Iraqi judicial system subjects the process to serious criticisms that 
detract from its legacy—and effectiveness.  If trials within a transforming society fall “on 
the spectrum with the show trial on one end and the conventional domestic criminal or 
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civil trial on the other,”114 then Saddam’s tribunal clearly counts as show trial.  Because 
the transgressions of the Ba’ath Regime were well known by Iraqis and the international 
community, what other purpose would a domestic trial serve?  After all, “everyone 
knows Saddam is guilty, so what is there to prove?”115 
A 2004 study released by the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) 
clearly articulated that the Iraqi people sought a domestic court for the purpose of seeking 
revenge and retribution against Saddam.   According to the report, the general perception 
of the population believed that the execution and torture of Saddam was sufficient, and 
no trial was required.  The study also concludes that the Iraqi people wanted the Saddam 
regime publically punished, “to put them on television to say that they killed, executed, 
and buried people.”116  Clearly, the victims were more concerned with extracting 
revenge, rather than the establishment of an enduring system of judicial democracy. 
Even more troubling was the report’s findings on the Iraqi population’s distrust 
for the United States.  The ICTJ study revealed significant public resentment of the 
United States for two reasons. First was the historical support the United States provided 
to the regime.  Second, there was a growing concern for the lack of security and public 
insurrection under the CPA.  Furthermore, participants of the study were disappointed 
with the UN for its lackluster rebukes of the tyrant as well as the disastrous economic 
effects of UN-imposed sanctions before the occupation.117  Essentially, the public clamor 
for a domestic criminal tribunal had little to do with a desire for justice or transformation 
of the process; rather, it was a lack of confidence in the international community coupled 
with a deep desire for revenge. 
D. WHITHER TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? 
Judicial transformation is a necessary requirement for nation-building, however 
“implementing piecemeal processes in transitional societies runs the enormous risk of 
failing to adequately address the past, arrive at the truth, achieve justice, and rebuild 
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trust.”118  All transitions are inherently different, so the process must account for the 
peculiarities of history, society, culture, time, and place.  The one-size fits all application 
of universal justice—as it applied by MacArthur in the Far East, for example—disregards 
the political, social, and cultural needs of the victims.  This same flaw characterized the 
trial of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 
In the case of Al-Dujail, the desire for retribution and punishment—by both the 
U.S. government and Iraqi people—was detrimental to the legacy of the IHCC as an 
effective means of transitional justice. The decision to conduct a domestic tribunal with 
the purpose of trying a brutish former dictator was unprecedented within the norms of 
international law.  The political motivations of the CPA and its extensive control of the 
tribunal process tainted the legacy Al-Dujail and undermined the perception of legitimacy 
for the Iraqi judicial system. The politicization of the trial by the occupation force, 
created a hybrid form of judicial-proceedings that attempted to fuse the “adversary-
accusatorial [procedural] American system with the Iraqi inquisitorial [substantive] 
one.”119 
The true purpose of post-conflict justice goes beyond the courtroom application of 
revenge or the punishment of the guilty.  Ultimately, the goal of the occupation force 
should be the transition of a war-torn society to accept and apply the rule of law.  First 
and foremost, transformation is predicated on an independent judiciary that has 
established both international and national creditability.  This is not to say that the 
judiciary is ready to accept the responsibility for the trial of domestic war criminals or 
gross violators of human rights.  Rather, the initial purpose of the judicial system should 
be to create mechanisms and processes for addressing grievances, both past and present. 
Creating a creditable means to address grievances will aid post-conflict security 
measures, maintain order by providing retribution, and reduce acts of retaliation and 
revenge.120 
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The use of tribunals to document Saddam’s gross violation of the rights of his 
people as citizens and human beings can only re-establish a small portion of the historical 
record.  Therefore, the transforming government must establish a mechanism of truth 
seeking, in order to properly document and preserve the historical memory.  A timely 
investigation of grievances would aid in establishing a larger national narrative, which 
would promote the trust, understanding, and hopefully, cultural unity.  The ICTJ 
recommends the use of truth commissions, which would, “provide a comprehensive 
account of past human rights abuses; provide victims with a forum that acknowledges 
their suffering; make recommendations about preventive measures; explore the 
possibility of providing reparations; and promote the rebuilding of trust and 
understanding without sacrificing accountability.”121 
As the historical record is created, the transitional nation must address the needs 
of those who suffered under the previous regime.  While compensation does not 
necessarily mend the wounds of the past, reparations can rebuild livelihoods, restore 
dignity and allow those who suffered most to join the new society on a somewhat steadier 
footing.  A mechanism to compensate victims by the new government would serve as 
both a material and symbolic recognition of past injustices and promote both national and 
international awareness.  In the case of Iraq, proper use of reparations could unify the 
Iraqi society, “on the basis of a shared legacy of persecution and repression.”122 
Ultimately, it may be that military tribunals can begin the process by which a 
post-conflict state can transition to the rule of law, the observation of human rights, 
democracy, and prosperity amid truth and reconciliation and “ownership” of the past.  To 
succeed in any sense, however, this transformation requires real support and will from 
within the transforming polity over the long term.  In other words, tribunals may initiate a 
transformation, but there is more to the project than convening a court session. 
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